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INTRODUCTION 
rbitration has a deep history in the United States, but in the last 
forty years, it has become an exceptionally prevalent form of 
dispute resolution. Agreements to arbitrate have become increasingly 
common—so much so that almost anyone with a cellular phone could 
be a party to one. When parties agree to arbitration, it is most often 
through a predispute arbitration agreement that presents as a clause in 
standard form contracts for services or employment.1 Often 
unnoticed, predispute arbitration agreements exist in contracts for 
many common goods and services.2 Examples include cellphone 
contracts, credit agreements, auto loans, school enrollment forms, 
nursing home contracts, and employment contracts.3 In many of these 
situations, arbitration is not consented to by way of a bargained for 
exchange but is rather a condition of sale. 
The foremost law controlling arbitration is the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA), which has been in effect for nearly a century.4 Though 
originally intended to ensure judicial recognition of arbitration,5 the 
FAA has since become a particularly contentious topic, splitting the 
opinions of pundits, legal scholars, and the Supreme Court. A series 
of Supreme Court decisions have served not only to guarantee judicial 
recognition of arbitration but to safeguard a “national policy favoring 
arbitration.”6 Preserving the national policy favoring arbitration, the 
Supreme Court has given the FAA significant preemptive force over 
 
1 ZACHARY GIMA ET AL., PUB. CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION: UNFAIR AND 
EVERYWHERE 1–2 (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEvery 
where.pdf (noting that seventy-five percent of the consumer industry companies that took 
part in the survey included mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts). 
2 EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
129–30 (2006) (discussing the expansion of arbitration agreements into everyday 
consumer transactions with financial institutions, service providers, and sellers of goods). 
3 Id. 
4 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2015). 
5 See Ashley M. Sergeant, The Corporation’s New Lethal Weapon: Mandatory Binding 
Arbitration Clauses, 57 S.D. L. REV 149, 153 (2012). 
6 Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 400 
(2004). 
A 
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state-made legislation that seeks even the slightest control over 
arbitration. With states consistently losing ground to the FAA in the 
Supreme Court, the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) has 
recently published the Model State Consumer and Employee Justice 
Enforcement Act (Model Act), which offers model statutory language 
the states can adopt whole, or in part, to both control arbitration and 
avoid FAA preemption. 
This Comment summarizes the FAA’s long and divisive 
jurisprudence, culminating in a critical review of the NCLC’s Model 
Act. This Comment intends to illustrate the tension in arbitration law 
between the prominent FAA and the states which have tried to 
maintain some control over arbitration. Part I outlines the state and 
processes of arbitration today, beginning with the context in which 
the FAA was enacted and its stated purpose. Part II considers how the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA and the decisions that gave 
rise to the astonishing scope the FAA now enjoys. After discussing 
the breadth of FAA jurisprudence, Part III examines problems the 
FAA has created for employees, consumers, and the plaintiff’s bar 
generally, as well as state legislatures and judiciaries. This part is not 
intended to weigh the merits of arbitration (in fact, the advantages of 
arbitration are almost entirely ignored), instead the purpose is to 
highlight the difficulties faced by aggrieved parties essentially forced 
to arbitrate their disputes and why states feel compelled to protect 
those parties. Part IV then analyzes why many scholars argue 
Congress or the Supreme Court should restore the states with some 
control over arbitration and how and why neither has made 
meaningful strides to do so. Lastly, Part V turns to the NCLC’s Model 
Act, assessing its potential as a legislative resource for states to gain 
some control over arbitration, absent action by Congress or the 
Supreme Court. 
I 
ARBITRATION’S LONG HISTORY 
A. Overview 
Arbitration is an industrious invention of common law and has 
become the dominant form of alternative dispute resolution in the 
American legal system.7 Arbitration is a “method of dispute 
 
7 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 108 (3d ed. 2005). 
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resolution in which the parties submit a dispute to an impartial 
(person or) persons who have been selected by the parties for a final 
and binding decision.”8 A hallmark of arbitration, and an attribute 
contributing to its popularity, is the significant amount of control 
maintained by the parties in creating their own arbitration agreement 
and, thus, in resolving their dispute. Arbitration has been summarized 
by the United States Department of Labor as a form of dispute 
resolution that “rests upon the voluntary agreement of the parties to 
submit their dispute to an outsider.”9 Using common law arbitration 
as a base, most states have altered and codified common law rules by 
implementing various arbitration statutes.10 
Despite the rising popularity of arbitration as an alternative form of 
dispute resolution, a perceived “judicial hostility” was harbored 
towards arbitration prior to 1925 and the modern arbitration 
statutes.11 This hostility stemmed from the thought that any procedure 
which deprived courts of their jurisdiction to hear cases was contrary 
to public policy.12 However, it is difficult to reconcile this rationale 
with the fact that courts routinely and voluntarily relinquish their 
jurisdiction where a valid settlement agreement, release, or covenant 
not to sue exists.13 Moreover, under the common law, executory 
arbitration agreements were effectively unenforceable due to a lack of 
procedural safeguards.14 Despite mounting procedural concerns over 
arbitration, the business community, which lobbied for the passage of 
the FAA, convinced Congress that the hostility towards arbitration 
 
8 Id. 
9 MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 11 (2d 
ed. 1991); see also Sergeant, supra note 5 (“Arbitration is a very unique system of 
industrial jurisprudence as it is virtually created and limited by the participants 
themselves.”). 
10 GRENIG, supra note 7, at 113; see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.600–36.740; WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 7.04A.010–7.04A.903; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281–1284.3 (West 2016). 
11 Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1250 (2011); 
see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
12 Aragaki, supra note 11, at 1251–52. 
13 Id. at 1252. 
14 Id. at 1250–51 (outlining three reasons executor arbitration agreements were 
practically unenforceable: (1) under the common law “revocability doctrine,” parties were 
entitled to revoke their promise to arbitrate at any time prior to the arbitrators issuing an 
award; (2) there was no legal mechanism for pleading an executory arbitration agreement 
as a complete bar to an action at law; and (3) courts refused to stay a legal action pending a 
determination of arbitrability, giving plaintiffs intent on evading arbitration a tactical 
advantage). 
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was both without merit and built purely on anti-arbitration bias.15 
Consequently, Congress passed the FAA in 1925 in an attempt to end 
the perceived judicial hostility to arbitration.16 
B. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
The FAA was enacted in an effort to bring reason and modernity to 
“what the business community increasingly viewed as the law’s 
‘unjust,’ irrational, and ‘anachronistic’ treatment of arbitration.”17 
The legislative history of the FAA shows that the law was originally 
intended to allow the enforcement of arbitration agreements between 
merchants.18 Congress therefore created the FAA with two purposes 
in mind. The first, unsurprisingly, was to “reverse the longstanding 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . that had been adopted 
by American courts.”19 The Second purpose was to put arbitration on 
equal footing with other contractual provisions.20 Unencumbered by 
concerns over the rudimentary (or in some instances, entirely absent) 
procedural rules of arbitration, Congress passed the FAA to cure 
hostility towards arbitration that “prevented parties who ‘[stood] upon 
equal footing . . . [from] intelligently and deliberately’ choosing to 
arbitrate their disputes.”21 
For parties choosing to arbitrate disputes, the FAA, in the most 
general sense, prescribes the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.22 
Section 2, the foremost substantive provision of the FAA, provides in 
relevant part: 
 
15 See id. at 1253. 
16 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric v. Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence, 75 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 130 (2012). 
17 Aragaki, supra note 11, at 1253. 
18 See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 
Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 (1924) (statement of 
Julius Cohen, Gen. Counsel, N.Y. State Chamber of Commerce). 
19 Sergeant, supra note 5; see also H.R. Rep. No. 96 (1924) (“The need for the law 
arises from . . . the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction . . . . The 
principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by 
the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be 
overturned without legislative enactment . . . .”). 
20 Sergeant, supra note 5, at 153. 
21 Aragaki, supra note 11 at 1254. 
22 See William G. Phelps, Annotation, Pre-emption by Federal Arbitration Act (9 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq.) of State Laws Prohibiting or Restricting Formation or Enforcement 
of Arbitration Agreements, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 179, § 4[a] (1992). 
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction    
. . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.23 
The language of the FAA is plainly obvious insofar as it applies to 
“any” contract (involving commerce) that contains an arbitration 
provision.24 However, from the plain language of the statute itself, it 
is less obvious where exactly the FAA derives its power to preempt 
state law. Under many federal statutes, the extent to which the federal 
law preempts a state law is expressly stated through a preemption 
clause in the federal statute.25 The FAA contains no such preemption 
clause, and grounds for preemption are not otherwise apparent in the 
language of the FAA.26 On this point, Justice Stevens remarked, 
“[e]ven though the [Federal] Arbitration Act had been on the books 
for almost 50 years in 1973, apparently neither the [Supreme] Court 
nor the litigants even considered the possibility that the [Federal 
Arbitration] Act had preempted state-created rights.”27 Though the 
FAA’s power to preempt state law remained largely unnoticed for 
some time, the Court interpreted that power as congressional intention 
for a “federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”28 To that end, 
the Supreme Court has afforded the FAA a remarkably wide breadth, 
and, through a series of decisions, the Court has made the FAA a 
formidable obstacle for state-made laws attempting to exercise control 
over arbitration.29 
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the FAA 
The FAA has been in effect for nearly a century, and, as Justice 
Stevens observed, its preemptive power went entirely unnoticed for 
decades.30 However, more recently, the FAA’s scope has become so 
 
23 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015). 
24 Id. 
25 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2015); 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (2015). 
26 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307. 
27 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
28 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
29 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. 
v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. 1; Prima Paint Corp. 
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
30 Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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broad it is now used to preempt state laws with no obvious connection 
to arbitration.31 Despite that the FAA contains no preemption clause, 
several Supreme Court cases can be credited with granting the FAA 
the broad scope and tremendous preemptive force it has today. 
The first of these cases is Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin 
Mfg. Co.32 The controversy persistent at the time, prompting the 
Supreme Court to hear the case, was whether a federal court, 
exercising diversity jurisdiction, should apply state law or the FAA in 
deciding the enforceability of an arbitration agreement.33 Until Prima 
Paint, federal courts had often resolved the issue under the Erie 
doctrine,34 which prescribes that in diversity cases, federal courts 
should apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.35 
Courts that chose to apply the Erie doctrine would therefore have 
interpreted the FAA to be a source of federal procedural law only.36 
However, in Prima Paint, the Court held that, in federal court, the 
FAA is a source of federal substantive law under the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution, irrespective of the Erie doctrine.37 Prima 
Paint thus established that the FAA would henceforth be interpreted 
and applied as substantive law, albeit only in federal courts. However, 
despite Prima Paint, lower courts were reluctant to hold that the FAA 
preempted state law for almost two decades longer.38 
In what is arguably the single most important decision in FAA 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court made a landmark ruling in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating.39 In Southland, the Court extended the 
reach of the FAA far beyond that in Prima Paint.40 Whereas Prima 
Paint declared that the FAA is substantive law in federal court,41 the 
Southland Court held that the substantive law created by the FAA is 
 
31 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998); Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Coe, 313 F. Supp. 2d 603 (S.D. W. Va. 2004). 
32 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
33 See Phelps, supra note 22, at § 2. 
34 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78−80 (1938). 
35 Phelps, supra note 22, at § 2. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.; see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 400, 405 
(1967). 
38 See Phelps, supra note 22, at § 2. 
39 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
40 Id. at 16. 
41 Id. 
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applicable in state court as well.42 The implications of this holding 
with respect to preemption are hard to overstate: The FAA, a federal 
law that the Court deemed to be both substantive and applicable in 
state court, would from then on preempt any state law that “stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of [the FAA’s] full 
purpose and objectives.”43 As future cases would demonstrate, state-
made laws only tenuously related to arbitration were struck down, 
construed as obstacles to the FAA’s purpose and objectives.44 
The Southland holding remained undisturbed for eleven years, until 
the Court’s decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson 
resolved challenges to  not only the preemptive effect of the FAA but 
also its scope.45 Addressing the preemption question first, the Court 
neither overruled Southland nor reviewed its merits, as it would have 
been “inappropriate to reconsider what is by now well-established 
law.”46 Moving to the scope of the FAA, the Court studied the 
legislative history and decades-old precedent to reach its decision.47 
The Court decided that Congress, to enact the FAA, had relied on its 
power to regulate interstate commerce.48 The Court consequently 
construed the scope of the FAA to extend to the full reach of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.49 As a result of 
Allied Bruce Terminix Cos., the FAA now applies to any transaction 
within the scope of the commerce power of the Constitution.50 
One of the most contentious developments in FAA jurisprudence 
has been the Supreme Court’s effective ban on class-wide arbitration. 
Though the Court has repeatedly and enthusiastically acknowledged a 
national policy in favor of arbitration,51 it has, in recent years, 
displayed an anti-class arbitration sentiment with equal enthusiasm. 
 
42 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16. 
43 Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1195 
(2011) (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000)). 
44 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1998); Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Coe, 313 F. Supp. 2d 603, 612 (S.D. W. Va. 2004). 
45 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995); see also Drahozal, supra note 6, at 402. 
46 Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272. 
47 Id. at 270−72; see also Drahozal, supra note 6, at 402. 
48 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)). 
49 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272–77 (1995). Justices 
Thomas and Scalia dissented from the majority in the case, arguing that Southland should 
have been overruled. Id. at 295–96 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
51 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
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One of the Court’s more recent arbitration decisions, AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, precluded class-wide arbitration entirely.52 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion put an end to class arbitration53 
and, in doing so, prompted a flood of literature on FAA jurisprudence 
and the role of arbitration in the U.S. legal system. At issue in 
Concepcion was California’s Discover Bank rule,54 under which a 
consumer arbitration agreement containing a waiver of class-wide 
arbitration in an adhesion contract was unconscionable and therefore 
unenforceable.55 In a split decision, a 5–4 Supreme Court held that 
the Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA because requiring 
class-wide arbitration “interferes with fundamental attributes of 
arbitration . . . .”56 The Court reasoned that bilateral dispute resolution 
is the fundamental attribute of arbitration with which the Discover 
Bank rule would interfere.57 In so holding, the Court was unequivocal 
in resolving any doubt left by an earlier case, Stolt-Nielsen,58 as to 
whether a class waiver in a predispute arbitration clause was 
unconscionable. Most commenters attribute the holding in 
Concepcion as the death knell for the class arbitration process.59 
Moreover, Concepcion is touted by FAA opponents as an egregious 
example of how the court has construed the FAA to preempt a law 
governing an area traditionally occupied by the states.60 
D. The FAA in the Context of Preemption Doctrine 
The FAA’s original purpose was simply to ensure the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements.61 However, the FAA adopted by Congress 
bears little resemblance to the Supreme Court’s current interpretation 
 
52 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011). 
53 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344. 
54 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
55 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333–34. 
56 Id. at 343. 
57 Id. 
58 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
59 Sara Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the 
Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 467 (2011). 
60 Drahozal, supra note 6, at 398 (“[I]n subject matter areas ‘traditionally occupied’ by 
the states, the Court applies a presumption against preemption: it presumes ‘that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
61 Sergeant, supra note 5, at 153. 
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of the Act, which now preempts an array of state laws with legitimate 
interest in areas like consumer protection.62 The Supreme Court has 
significantly widened the scope and bolstered the preemptive force of 
the FAA over the last three decades.63 The FAA has, as a result, 
become a major impediment for states seeking to pass and enforce 
their own laws on arbitration. The scope of FAA preemption has been 
surprising because a preemption clause, which would provide 
evidence of Congress’s manifest intent that the FAA should preempt 
state law, is conspicuously absent from the Act.64 The FAA has 
therefore become a formidable presence in state courts due to both the 
Supreme Court’s preference for arbitrability and the fact that FAA 
preemption cases have been decided in the context of broader 
preemption doctrine.65 
Preemption doctrine is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution.66 The Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law is 
the “supreme law of the Land.”67 Whether a particular federal statute 
preempts a particular state statute (thereby displacing the state law) is 
a matter of congressional intent.68 To determine congressional intent, 
the Supreme Court has employed what has been called a “categorical” 
approach to preemption issues.69 Within this framework, scholars 
largely agree that FAA Section 2 preemption is a brand of “implied 
obstacle preemption.”70 The term “implied preemption” refers to 
preemption that occurs even where Congress has not expressly 
included a preemption clause in the federal statute.71 “Obstacle 
preemption,” a subcategory of implied preemption, refers to situations 
in which state law is preempted when it “stands as an obstacle to the 
 
62 See, e.g., Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333–34. 
63 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967). 
64 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015). 
65 Drahozal, supra note 6, at 396. 
66 Id. at 397. 
67 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
68 Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) 
(“The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.”). 
69 Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretative 
Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (1998); see also Drahozal, supra note 6, at 396. 
70 Aragaki, supra note 43, at 1195; see also Drahozal, supra note 6, at 398. 
71 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); see also Drahozal, supra note 6, at 
396 (contrasting implied preemption with express preemption, in which congress indicates 
the extent that state law is preempted in the language of the statute). 
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accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”72 
In its FAA preemption cases, the Court has determined that the 
FAA’s objective, as specified by Congress in the language of Section 
2 of the statute, is that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable.”73 Under this characterization of the 
FAA, Professor Hiro N. Aragaki has observed that the FAA’s ability 
to preempt state law turns on two factors.74 The first factor examines 
whether or not the given state law is enforcement impeding, or stated 
differently, whether the state law, even partially, impairs a “provision 
. . . to settle a controversy by arbitration thereafter arising.”75 The 
second factor considers whether the state law in question “singles 
out” arbitration for disfavor, as opposed to being “generally 
applicable” to principles of contract law.76 Though “singles out” is 
somewhat ambiguous, Professor Aragaki has contended that the term 
applies to state laws that facially apply only to arbitration or seek 
specifically to regulate arbitration.77 State laws that both impede 
enforcement and single out arbitration will always be preempted.78 
Conversely, a state law that is merely generally applicable to 
principles of contract law will not be preempted.79 
II 
THE FAA’S WAKE OF ADVERSARIES 
The Supreme Court has expanded the applicability of the FAA to 
cover almost all employment and consumer contracts and to render 
arbitration agreements enforceable regardless of whether parties have 
actually bargained over them.80 As a result, the increasingly pervasive 
use of predispute arbitration agreements has left a number of parties 
 
72 Drahozal, supra note 6, at 397–98 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941)). 
73 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 333–34 (2011). 
74 Aragaki, supra note 43, at 1195. 
75 Id. at 1196 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015)) (impairing an arbitration provision includes 
impairing agreements on time, place, or manner of arbitration, as well as the agreement to 
arbitrate). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See generally IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN 
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (Carolina Academic Press 2013). 
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aggrieved in its wake. This Part names some of the parties adversely 
affected by the “national policy in favor of arbitration” and sets out 
some of the more prevalent arguments in opposition of the FAA and 
applicable jurisprudence. This Comment ignores the arguments of the 
proponents of arbitration. The intent is not to condemn the use of 
arbitration entirely. Instead, this Comment aims to show that the 
prominence of the FAA in state courts has handcuffed both state 
judiciaries and unassuming parties to arbitration. 
Growing concern abounds in scholarship over the perceived 
inequity in arbitration that has prompted broad critical review of FAA 
jurisprudence.81 Those who oppose the current FAA jurisprudence 
include the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), the 
National Employment Lawyers Association, the Equal Employment 
Advisory Council, the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), at 
least twenty state attorneys general, the plaintiff’s bar, and other 
consumer advocacy groups.82  Those who oppose arbitration make 
the broad contention that it can “unjustly deny American citizens their 
day in court.”83 The many opponents diverge, however, in their 
opinions on how arbitration can be unjust. Some of the more 
prevalent arguments are addressed below. 
A. Forced Arbitration 
As Supreme Court FAA jurisprudence currently stands, state courts 
are obligated to enforce what are commonly referred to as forced 
arbitration agreements.84 Forced arbitration agreements are the result 
of an arbitration provision in a contract of adhesion.85 An adhesion 
contract is one “in which one of the parties has enough bargaining 
power to be able to dictate the terms of the contract to the other on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis, and the weaker party has no choice but to 
‘adhere’ to the terms”86 or forgo the good or service. The Supreme 
Court has based its decision to uphold forced arbitration agreements 
 
81 Id.; see also Cole, supra note 59, at 482; Aragaki, supra note 43, at 1191−92. 
82 See DAVID SELIGMAN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE MODEL STATE 
CONSUMER AND EMPLOYEE JUSTICE ENFORCEMENT ACT (2015) [hereinafter MODEL 
ACT]; Sergeant, supra note 5, at 162–63. 
83 Sergeant, supra note 5, at 164 (referring specifically to forced arbitration). 
84 Mara Kent, Forced vs. Compulsory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims, 23 L. & INEQ. 
95 (2005). 
85 Id. 
86 BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, CONTRACTS: CASES, DISCUSSION, AND 
PROBLEMS 483 (3d ed. 2012). 
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largely on parties’ freedom to contract.87 The Court reasons that since 
the parties agree to arbitration in their contract, they should be held to 
their bargain.88 Indeed, a fundamental principle in contract law is the 
manifestation of consent to contractual terms.89 The Supreme Court 
has reiterated that mantra, stating that arbitration “is a matter of 
consent, not coercion.”90 However, critics of arbitration find the 
Court’s distinction between consent and coercion in forced arbitration 
to be disingenuous.91 Under circumstances in which an adhesion 
contract is involved, arbitration critics view the agreement as forced 
because the signee is presented with an ultimatum—sign the contract 
and agree to arbitrate, or don’t sign and forgo the use of the good or 
service.92 Such an ultimatum is, the critics contend, a form of 
coercion that should not be enforced.93 
Much of the criticism aimed at arbitration is exacerbated by forced 
arbitration. However, even where parties have equal bargaining 
power, it can be argued that a party agreeing to arbitration may not 
realize she has agreed to arbitrate in lieu of her constitutional right to 
assert a legal claim against the other party.94 Some have argued that if 
arbitration were better understood, the agreeing parties would 
structure their agreements more favorably, or not at all.95 However, in 
the context of forced arbitration, the non-drafting party has no 
bargaining power and therefore no opportunity to negotiate for terms 
more advantageous to themselves. As a result, the drafting party is in 
a better position to impose the terms of an arbitration upon the non-
drafting party with less bargaining power. 
B. Class Arbitration Waivers 
In many situations, large businesses or employers who typically 
include arbitration clauses in their standard form contracts prefer 
 
87 Kent, supra note 84, at 95; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 23 (1991). 
88 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. 
89 BLUM & BUSHAW, supra note 86, at 59. 
90 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
479 (1989). 
91 Cunningham, supra note 16, at 141–42. 
92 Kent, supra note 84. 
93 Id. at 95–96. 
94 Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1631–32 (2005). 
95 Id. 
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arbitration to litigation because it gives the companies a strategic 
advantage.96 By resolving a dispute through arbitration, companies 
can preclude the possibility of a class action claim against them in the 
future.97 Class arbitration affords plaintiffs many of the same benefits 
found in class action litigation.98 Class actions benefit plaintiffs with 
small value claims that might otherwise be too expensive or difficult 
to bring individually by allowing members of the class to aggregate 
their claims.99 Similarly, class actions place members of a 
consolidated class with aggregated claims on footing more equal to 
large businesses, as opposed to an individual plaintiff with a low 
value claim.100 The potential of an adverse judgment under which the 
corporation has to pay large sums in damages to the entire class is a 
strong deterrent for legally actionable conduct.101 
Since Concepcion,102 the group most vehemently opposed to class 
arbitration waivers is consumer advocates. The National Consumer 
Law Center (NCLC) has found that, because class action waivers 
prevent the aggregation of low value claims, such “waivers have 
effectively squelched hundreds of viable consumer and employment 
class actions – often in cases that are impossible or very difficult to 
bring on an individual basis.”103 Moreover, since large payouts to a 
class serves as a deterrent to violating consumer rights, consumer 
advocates argue that without the class action remedy, “companies 
[are] able to violate consumer rights in small ways with impunity.”104 
Critics of arbitration feel class arbitration waivers stand in the way of 
the vindication of low value claims—a major problem associated with 
consumer arbitration.105 
 
96 Cole, supra note 59, at 478–79. 
97 Id. at 478. 
98 Lisa Pomerantz, Consumer Arbitration: Pre-Dispute Resolution Clauses and Class 
Action Waivers, 71 CONSUMER ARBITRATION 17, 18 (2016) (“Class Actions allow 
plaintiffs in cases where there are common issues of law and fact to represent all similarly 
situated plaintiffs, provided certain other conditions are met.”). 
99 Cole, supra note 59, at 477–78. 
100 See Pomerantz, supra note 98, at 17. 
101 See id. 
102 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 333–34 (2011) (holding 
bilateral dispute resolution to be a fundamental attribute of arbitration, thereby precluding 
the use of class arbitration). 
103 MODEL ACT, supra note 82, at 7. 
104 Pomerantz, supra note 98, at 17. 
105 Id. 
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C. Repeat Player Bias and Inefficiency in Arbitration 
One of the most hotly contested debates in arbitration literature 
centers on what has been called repeat player bias. The repeat player 
bias argument contends that arbitrators are partial, and that a party 
drafting an arbitration clause will choose from arbitrators who 
frequently rule in the party’s favor.106 To understand the basic 
premise at play with repeat player bias, one must view arbitration as 
an industry and arbitration providers as businesses. As such, 
arbitrators are robustly criticized for not delivering the efficient and 
impartial form of dispute resolution that arbitration is intended to 
provide. The drafter of an arbitration agreement has the opportunity to 
specify where, when, and which arbitrator(s) will administer the 
arbitration hearing.107 The drafter therefore has the opportunity to 
select an arbitrator more likely to rule in the drafter’s favor or one 
who has done so in the past.108 Since arbitrators and arbitration 
providers like the American Arbitration Association (AAA) are in the 
business of administering arbitration hearings, they have a strong 
incentive to rule in favor of the drafting party to attract future 
business.109 This phenomenon explains why parties that frequently 
arbitrate are termed “repeat players,” and whether arbitrators are 
biased toward or against them is a contentious topic amongst 
arbitration proponents and opponents.110 The merits of the repeat 
player bias argument aside, even the perception of a partial 
adjudicator is intolerable in our legal system, a system that has made 
a deliberate effort to “prevent even the probability of unfairness.”111 
Consistent with the idea that forced arbitration agreements favor 
the drafting party is the contention that arbitration can in fact be more 
expensive, more time consuming, and less efficient than litigation.112 
The drafting party can specify the time and place the arbitration 
hearing is to take place, thereby potentially imposing large travel 
costs on the other party.113 The arbitration provision could also 
allocate arbitration initiation fees to the non-drafting party and require 
 
106 Sergeant, supra note 5, at 164. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Cole, supra note 59, at 475. 
110 Id. 
111 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 
112 Sergeant, supra note 5, at 165. 
113 Id. 
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attorney’s fees from the losing party.114 Arbitration proponents rebut 
these contentions, stating that arguments portraying arbitration as 
inefficient are simply untrue.115 
Compounded with the potentially large costs imposed on those 
who arbitrate is the fact that financial awards granted by arbitrators 
are typically smaller than those granted by judges and juries.116 
Moreover, binding arbitration agreements frequently prohibit punitive 
damages and injunctive relief, thus limiting a potential award.117 
According to one study, “[c]omparisons of average awards by 
arbitrators and courts in employment cases and medical malpractice 
cases show that arbitration claimants receive only about twenty 
percent of the damages that they would have received in court.”118 
D. Confidentiality and Disclosure 
A common concern often raised by arbitration opponents is the 
privacy and lack of disclosure throughout the proceeding.119 The 
confidentiality of the proceeding means that only the involved parties 
know of the outcome, so there is no legal precedent created or 
doctrine of stare decisis to assist arbitrators in adjudicating future 
disputes.120 An arbitrator is not required to offer a written decision, 
consider legal precedent, or even follow state or federal law in issuing 
his or her decision.121 The only real requirement of an arbitrator is 
that he or she must not act in blatant disregard of the law.122 
Arbitration critics contend that overzealous efforts to keep arbitration 
proceedings confidential have made resulting arbitration decisions 
less legally sound, less uniform, and less predictable than their 
judicial counterparts.123 
In sum, the primary argument against arbitration is that the drafting 
party has the opportunity to “stack the deck” against a non-drafting 
party. Still, proponents of arbitration consider this argument to be 
 
114 Cole, supra note 59, at 475 (noting that if there is any merit to the repeat player 
theory, the losing party will often be the non-drafting party). 
115 Sergeant, supra note 5, at 163. 
116 Id. at 165. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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overstated and, at times, entirely inaccurate.124 Setting the merits of 
the arguments aside, however, it is undisputed that states have been 
active in trying establish their own arbitration laws but have been 
largely unsuccessful in doing so.125 With state law losing ground to 
federal law in the Supreme Court, commenters have called for an 
intervention, either by act of Congress or for the Supreme Court to 
break from its current jurisprudence.126 
III 
ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN ARBITRATION LAW MUST COME 
FROM EITHER CONGRESS OR THE SUPREME COURT 
In the decades since Congress enacted the FAA to end the judicial 
hostility toward arbitration,127 the Supreme Court has given almost 
unwavering support to arbitration.128 As a result of the steadfast 
support the FAA has received from the Court, the Act now presents 
an almost insurmountable obstacle for the states seeking to regulate 
arbitration. Therefore, state laws traditionally authorized under states’ 
“historic police powers” and only tenuously related to arbitration have 
been found to be in conflict with, and displaced by, the FAA.129 So 
long as the Court is willing to brush aside state law addressing areas 
like consumer fraud and labor rights to instead rigorously enforce 
private choices to arbitrate, there will be little room for any state law 
on arbitration. Any meaningful judicial change in FAA jurisprudence 
would require Southland to be overruled, and that is a path the Court 
has already refused to take.130 Another source of possible change is 
Congress, but legislative intervention has so far been ineffective.131 
A. The Supreme Court 
With state law on arbitration losing ground to the FAA in the 
Supreme Court, some scholars believe meaningful change in FAA 
 
124 Cole, supra note 59, at 475 (“Claims that consumer arbitration is inherently unfair 
were overstated.”). 
125 Aragaki, supra note 43, at 1190. 
126 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 16, at 159. 
127 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
128 Id. 
129 Drahozal, supra note 6, at 398 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947)). 
130 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995). 
131 See infra Part III.B. 
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jurisprudence can occur only by overruling Southland.132 However, 
such a contention seems like wishful thinking when the Supreme 
Court has shown no inclination to do away with, or even weaken, 
Southland and its progeny.133 
There was, for a short time, a choice of law loophole in the 
Southland holding established by Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. 
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,134 but it was 
promptly closed by Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.135 
The contract disputed in Volt contained both an arbitration provision 
and a choice of law provision. The issue before the Court was what 
effect the choice of law clause had on FAA preemption.136 This issue 
presented an interesting dilemma for the Court, which had developed 
a precedent of taking the hardline approach of rigorously enforcing 
arbitration agreements according to their terms.137 According to the 
terms of the contract in Volt, the parties had expressly chosen to use 
not only an arbitration clause but also a choice of law provision 
specifying the use of California arbitration law.138 The Court 
therefore had to decide between two bargained-for provisions in the 
contract: just as the arbitration agreement was evidence of the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate, the choice of law provision evidenced an 
agreement for the application of California law.139 Somewhat 
surprisingly, the Supreme Court followed the California Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the choice of law provision, giving effect to 
that clause.140 Although upholding the choice of law provision led to 
a different outcome than if the Court had decided the FAA governed, 
the Court reasoned that the state law in question “simply d[id] not 
offend the rule of liberal construction” of the FAA.141 The Court 
elaborated that the FAA does not preempt the entire field of 
arbitration law,142 lending validity to the contention that FAA 
preemption is a form of obstacle preemption. The holding in Volt 
 
132 See Aragaki, supra note 43, at 1237. 
133 Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272. 
134 489 U.S. 468, 478−79 (1989). 
135 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995). 
136 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. Of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 
(1989). 
137 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454 (2003). 
138 Volt, 489 U.S. at 472. 
139 Id. at 475–76. 
140 Id. at 476. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 477. 
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therefore opened up a loophole in the Southland decision, in that a 
state court “could construe the choice of law clause as an agreement 
to follow the state arbitration law and continue to enforce at least 
some state laws that would otherwise be preempted under 
Southland.”143 
However, in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the 
Supreme Court quickly closed the loophole opened in Volt.144 Similar 
to that in Volt, the contract in Mastrobuono too contained a general 
choice of law provision, but the Mastrobuono Court arrived at a 
different outcome, holding that the choice of law clause was 
preempted.145 In Volt, the Court had construed the choice of law 
clause as an agreement to apply state arbitration law, whereas in 
Mastrobuono the Court construed the choice of law clause as an 
agreement that “New York’s substantive rights and obligations, and 
not the State’s allocation of power between alternative tribunals” 
governed the relationship.146 To reconcile the two seemingly 
contradictory decisions, the Court narrowed its former holding, 
stating that Volt was a case where the Court deferred to the California 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of contract law,147 while in 
Mastrobuono, the Court was reviewing a lower federal court 
interpretation to which it owed no deference.148 
Although there was little remarkable about Mastrobuono or a 
similar case, Allied Bruce Terminix, in terms of their precedential 
effect, these cases were indicative of the Supreme Court’s intention to 
fully support the national policy in favor of arbitration. Decided only 
three months apart, Allied-Bruce Terminix bluntly refused to overrule 
Southland, and Mastrobuono closed the loophole in the Southland 
holding which had allowed for the enforcement of some state made 
laws on arbitration. These decisions solidified the Court’s sentiment 
expressed in Southland a decade earlier—that “Congress intended to 
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.”149 Writing in dissent from the majority 
 
143 Drahozal, supra note 6, at 406. 
144 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995). 
145 Id. 
146 Compare Volt, 489 U.S. at 478−79 with Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 64; see also 
Drahozal, supra note 6, at 405–06. 
147 Recall that contract law is an area of law “traditionally occupied by the states.” 
Drahozal, supra note 6, at 398. 
148 Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 60 n.4. 
149 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
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opinion in Allied-Bruce Terminix, Justice O’Connor eloquently 
summed up Southland and its progeny: “Today’s decision caps this 
Court’s effort to expand the Federal Arbitration Act. Although each 
decision has built logically upon the decisions preceding it, the initial 
building block in Southland laid a faulty foundation.”150 Recognizing 
that the Supreme Court was unwilling to deviate from the path it 
started down with Southland, Justice O’Connor stated, “[i]t remains 
now for Congress to correct this interpretation if it wishes to preserve 
state autonomy in state courts.”151 
B. Congress 
In addition to Justice O’Connor, many legal scholars believe the 
FAA is due for legislative reform.152 Recognizing the harms caused 
by the rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements, the federal 
government has taken several positive, albeit small, steps to address 
the issue.153 
One example is the Military Lending Act, which prohibits lenders 
from including arbitration clauses in credit contracts with military 
personnel and their dependents.154 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) 
prohibits lenders from using forced arbitration clauses in mortgage 
agreements.155 Further, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which “promulgate[s] 
regulations prohibiting or limiting arbitration agreements involving 
consumer financial products.”156 Another notable intervention by the 
federal government is the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive 
Order.157 This order “prohibits pre-dispute, binding arbitration 
agreements covering discrimination, assault, and sexual harassment 
claims in contracts between federal contractors and their 
employees.”158 While these examples indicate that the federal 
 
150 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995). 
151 Id. 
152 MODEL ACT, supra note 82, at 2 (“Forced arbitration of consumer and employment 
disputes is the scourge of the American justice system that calls for action at every level of 
government.”). 
153 See id. at 3–4. 
154 Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2015). 
155 MODEL ACT, supra note 82, at 2; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e) (2015). 
156 MODEL ACT, supra note 82, at 2; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2015). 
157 MODEL ACT, supra note 82, at 2; see also Exec. Order No. 13,673, 81 Fed. Reg. 
58,653 (July 31, 2014). 
158 MODEL ACT, supra note 82, at 2. 
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government is at least aware of the harms caused by forced arbitration 
and has shown some effort to fix it, this legislation is limited to the 
extent that it applies only to very specific parties in a narrow set of 
circumstances. As a result, federal involvement has been largely 
ineffective at preventing forced arbitration in most situations. 
Although the modest intervention by the federal government shows 
that federal lawmakers are aware of the problem, many proposed 
amendments to the FAA have failed to gain traction.159 Few of these 
bills made it out of the committee stage of the legislative process and 
those that did were never voted on by the House or Senate.160 The 
legislation with the most potential to shift the legal landscape created 
by the FAA was the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA), introduced first 
in 2009 and again in 2011.161 The aim of the AFA was to “restrict 
forced arbitration and allow consumers and employees to choose 
arbitration after a dispute occurs.”162 To achieve its purpose, the AFA 
would have prohibited any predispute arbitration agreement that 
required the arbitration of an employment, consumer, or civil rights 
dispute.163 Had the AFA passed, it would have eliminated many of 
the problems the FAA currently presents, but with those problems it 
also would have occasionally eliminated arbitration agreements 
between parties with equal bargaining power.164 Professor Sarah 
Rudolph Cole speculates that the AFA overstated the case against 
arbitration, and its overzealous approach made it unpalatable to 
corporate interests and many consumer and employee advocates 
alike.165 When the AFA was last proposed in 2011, the political 
climate was ripe for its passing, with a Democratic President, 
Democratic legislators, and a series of adverse Supreme Court 
decisions.166 The AFA failed nonetheless.167 Considering the lack of 
 
159 See, e.g., H.R. 815, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2282, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 2435, 
107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. H.R. 1887, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2969, 
109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 
931, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011). 
160 Cole, supra note 59, at 458. 
161 Id.; see also H.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009). 
162 Cole, supra note 59, at 458; see also H.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). 
163 Cole, supra note 59, at 458; see also H.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). 
164 Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of 
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 
449, 477 (1996). 
165 Cole, supra note 59, at 458. 
166 Id. at 459–60. 
167 Id. at 458. 
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support garnered by the AFA, the likelihood of significant legislative 
intervention by the federal government in the near future appears 
suspect. 
IV 
THE NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER’S MODEL STATE 
CONSUMER AND EMPLOYEE JUSTICE REFORM ACT 
Consumers and consumer advocates have been particularly 
affected by the national policy in favor of arbitration. The National 
Consumer Law Center (NCLC), close observer and vocal advocate 
for overhauling the FAA, has recently published model statutory 
language that states can adopt to protect themselves from the harms of 
forced arbitration without interfering with private parties’ right, 
embodied in the FAA, to enter into arbitration agreements.168 The 
NCLC’s Model State Consumer and Employee Justice Enforcement 
Act (Model Act) articulates the need for further action by the federal 
government in the area of arbitration and proposes statutory language 
intended to be effective even absent legislative or judicial reform.169 
The Model Act is, however, a modest proposal, and it seems the 
Model Act would do little to prevent or even mitigate the most serious 
harms imposed by the FAA in the majority of instances. The NCLC’s 
approach is reserved and the statutory language of the Model Act 
does not provide the states with that necessary to reclaim the ground 
lost to the FAA in the Supreme Court. Rather, the language provided 
by the Model Act will only help the states to dig their proverbial heels 
in the ground and prevent the FAA from gaining any more territory of 
arbitration law from the states. Although this Comment is critical of 
the Model Act, the Model Act may strike the best balance in a nearly 
impossible dilemma. To its credit, the NCLC has proffered some 
enlightened prospective solutions to what many scholars see as a 
hopeless situation. In that regard, the Model Act is commendable in 
its pragmatism. Instead of recounting the litany of reasons FAA 
jurisprudence is harmful to the states and arguing the need for 
legislative or judicial intervention, the Model Act operates under the 
pretext that there will likely be no legislative or judicial intervention 
and, nevertheless, offers statutory language that is intended to work 
under the current FAA. 
 
168 MODEL ACT, supra note 82, at 12. 
169 Id. at 2. 
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The Model Act is organized into eight titles—some are specific to 
FAA preemption, others relate to states’ powers more generally.170 
The titles seeking to protect state interests,171 Titles I and II, exceed 
the scope of this Comment and are excluded. Titles III through VI, 
which seek to protect consumers’ and employees’ access to justice, 
are the focus of the remainder of this part. The following subsections 
contain a summary of the Model Act’s Titles III through VII and what 
the NCLC intends each title to accomplish. This part also provides 
some analysis on what each title might accomplish if in fact enacted 
by a state legislature. 
A. Clear Notice and Single Document Rule 
Title III of the Model Act sets out the “Clear Notice and Single 
Document Rule.”172 This title aims to add clarity to the “obscure and 
overly complex” language typical to consumer and employment 
contracts.173 The intent behind Title III is “to ensure that private 
parties comprehend the material terms of the consumer and 
employment contracts into which they enter,” and it requires adequate 
disclosure of terms and conditions.174 Title III specifies that any non-
conforming contract may be reformed by a court to reflect the 
agreement of the parties.175 In reforming the contract, a court may 
exclude any provision that does not adhere to the specification of 
Title III.176 
Though the NCLC is adamant that Title III escapes FAA 
preemption,177 this Author is less confident. The title proposes a state 
law strikingly similar to a Montana statute preempted in Doctor’s 
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.178 In Casarotto, the Supreme Court had 
no trouble preempting the Montana statute that “directly conflict[ed] 
with §2 of the FAA because the state’s law condition[ed] the 
 
170 Id. at 12. 
171 Id. at 1. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 39. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 41–42. 
178 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996). The Montana statute 
in question required conspicuous notice on the front page of a contract that the contract 
included an arbitration clause. Id. 
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enforceability of arbitration agreements . . . .”179 It appears likely that 
Title III could be displaced by a preemption challenge because, 
similar to Casarotto, Title III likewise allows for the exclusion of any 
provision that does not conform with the requirements of Title III. By 
placing qualifications on what terms may be given effect by a court, 
Title III conditions enforceability of the arbitration agreement, even if 
it stops short of singling out arbitration specifically. Thus, the Court 
could hold that Title III frustrates the intentions of Congress as 
specified in section 2 of the FAA. Given the parallels between the 
statute in Casarotto and the NCLC’s single document rule, it is 
entirely possible that the single document rule could and would be 
preempted. 
Title III’s single document rule may be preempted under the 
reasoning articulated in Concepcion. Concepcion decided that a state 
law routinely applied to arbitration stands as an “obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress” and will therefore be preempted.180 Such language 
suggests that if Title III is used to routinely thwart arbitration 
agreements, it may also be considered an obstacle to the execution of 
the full purposes of the FAA. 
Moreover, contrary to what the NCLC contends, it is doubtful that 
Title III can achieve its stated purpose. Title III is meant to “ensure 
that private parties comprehend the material terms of the consumer 
and employment contracts into which they enter.”181 However, to 
comprehend an arbitration provision, one would have to not only 
know what arbitration is, but also understand that it is an alternative 
to litigation. The reasons why litigation may be more favorable to a 
consumer than arbitration are complex, and the average consumer or 
employee may not be adequately informed of his or her choice to 
make the informed decision the NCLC attempts to make available. 
Even if an arbitration clause is accompanied by a thorough 
explanation of what exactly it is, can a consumer be expected to 
appreciate the gravity of a class action waiver, the difference in 
damages available through arbitration instead of litigation, or the 
merits of the repeat player bias argument? Can anyone not steeped in 
arbitration literature fully appreciate what agreeing to arbitration in 
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lieu of litigation truly entails, especially at the predispute stage of the 
transaction? At the risk of being cynical, it seems unlikely. 
Finally, in the context of forced arbitration, even if the arbitration 
provision were presented to the most knowledgeable of consumers 
and in bold technicolor typeface with a detailed description, 
comprehension of the arbitration agreement alone does not 
necessarily  benefit the consumer or solve the problems inherent in an 
unequal bargain. Even if the consumer is aware of the arbitration 
provision, she is still presented with the same ultimatum that adhesion 
contracts ubiquitously present—the contract is still offered on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis, and completing the transaction will require 
consent to arbitration. In the context of forced arbitration, finding and 
comprehending the arbitration provision is not the problem. The 
larger issue for the consumer is her inability to negotiate for the 
removal of an arbitration provision if she would prefer litigation. 
B. Unconscionable Terms 
Title IV is entitled “Unconscionable Terms in Standard form 
Contracts” and seeks to define unconscionable terms pertaining to 
dispute resolution and end the common practice of including them in 
predispute arbitration agreements.182 Title IV identifies five 
provisions for which it establishes a rebuttable presumption that they 
are substantively unconscionable.183 Title IV thus shifts the burden of 
persuasion to the party seeking to enforce the contract to show that 
the inclusion of any of these terms is not unconscionable. As the 
authors acknowledge, these provisions reflect common law principles 
that are already used in many state courts, and as such, they are 
comfortably beyond the reach of FAA preemption.184 However, by 
this some token, Title IV provides very little new protection for 
individual consumers or employees and does not noticeably change 
the inherently one-sided dynamic between consumer or employee, 
and business or employer. 
By defining certain terms as unconscionable, Title IV aims to 
enhance consumer protection in two ways. First, on an individual 
level, the consumer is saved from later having to resolve her dispute 
 
182 MODEL ACT, supra note 82, at 47; see also Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. 
Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The 
Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 72–73 (2004). 
183 MODEL ACT, supra note 82, at 47. 
184 Id. 
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pursuant to the unconscionable terms to which she agreed pre-
dispute.185 Moreover, by codifying a list of terms that are 
presumptively unconscionable, the Model Act seeks to cure the 
chilling effect unconscionable terms have on otherwise valid 
claims.186 Although having a list of terms that are statutorily 
presumptively unconscionable may help an individual who is already 
willing to arbitrate his or her dispute, empirical evidence suggests that 
the provisions of Title IV may not cure, at least not significantly, the 
chilling effect unconscionable terms have on putative claims.187 
Empirical evidence suggests that Title IV will be less successful in 
mitigating the chilling effect predispute arbitration agreements have 
on potential claimants in two ways. First, research suggests that 
predispute arbitration agreements, at least facially, put both parties on 
equal footing.188 The facial appearance of equality is a key feature in 
defending claims of unconscionability.189 Since Title IV simply 
codifies the principles of unconscionability as they are found at 
common law, it does not follow that mere codification will provide 
claimants with any additional protection. 
Moreover, evidence indicates that most predispute arbitration 
provisions will survive unconscionability challenges when rebutting a 
presumption of unconscionability requires an inquiry deeper than a 
mere facial appearance of fairness analysis.190 Empirical evidence 
shows several things: (1) arbitration proceedings are almost always 
held at a location convenient to the consumer and the business; (2) the 
vast majority of clauses place no limits on substantive remedies; (3) 
either party may be represented by counsel; that either party may 
specify means of provisional relief; (4) when small claims are 
exempted from arbitration, they are exempt for both parties; (5) the 
rules of evidence are relaxed for both parties; (6) discovery is limited 
for both parties; and (7) expenses are often split equally between 
consumers and businesses.191 
Section 2, subsections (a) through (e) of Title IV, provide the terms 
that the Model Act deems presumptively unconscionable.192 Of these 
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subsections, (a), (d), and (e) label presumptively unconscionable 
certain conditions a drafting party may impose on a claimant in order 
for that claimant to engage in an arbitration proceeding.193 
Alternatively, subsections (b) and (c) render presumptively 
unconscionable terms that limit the potential awards, including 
punitive damages, that may be awarded to the claimant.194 Although a 
larger potential reward can offset a claimant’s reservations about 
pursuing costly arbitration, insufficient resources to initiate arbitration 
at the outset can preclude a claim from ever going forward. Therefore, 
subsections (a), (d), and (e), the provisions that seek to provide access 
to arbitration, stand to potentially be more effective at curing the 
chilling effect unconscionable predispute agreements have on future 
claims. 
Whereas subsections (a), (d), and (e) are intended to provide 
potential claimants with enhanced access to arbitration, evidence 
suggests Title IV may not be as helpful in this regard as intended.195 
For instance, Title IV section 2(a) states it is unconscionable for the 
agreement to require the claimant to arbitrate her claim in an 
inconvenient venue.196 However, it has been shown that arbitration is 
held, almost always, at a location convenient to the consumer and 
business.197 Moreover, Title IV section 2(d) seeks to reduce the costs 
of filing for arbitration in the hopes that reduced costs improve access 
to arbitration and will thus mitigate the chilling of claims.198 
However, evidence indicates that even when fees are split equally, the 
burden will fall disproportionately on the ordinarily less-financially 
able consumer.199 
Although Title IV section 2 does little to expand the doctrine of 
unconscionability as applicable to arbitration, sections 4 and 5 
provide statutory language potentially strong enough to dissuade 
businesses from including unconscionable terms in predispute 
arbitration agreements.200 
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194 Id. 
195 See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 182, at 72. 
196 MODEL ACT, supra note 83, at 43. 
197 Pomerantz, supra note 98, at 18. 
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Section 4 establishes a “rebuttable presumption that a term in a 
standard form contract that is found to be unconscionable is not 
severable from the agreement in which it is situated.”201 A 
presumption against severing the unenforceable term is in contrast to 
the rule in a majority of jurisdictions.202 Under the majority rule, the 
unconscionable term is severed from the rest of the agreement, and 
the rest of the arbitration agreement remains enforceable.203 Even if 
the arbitration agreement becomes more equal after a court has 
stricken the unconscionable terms, it would be at the claimant’s legal 
expense.204 Under the majority rule regarding severability, if 
businesses become aware that the most severe consequence of 
including unconscionable provisions in their agreements is the 
removal of those provisions, businesses may continue to offer illegal 
contract provisions with impunity.205 However, under the language of 
section 4, including a term found to be unconscionable would result in 
a court deciding that the entire agreement is unenforceable.206 A 
business forced to concede its ability to arbitrate a dispute would 
subject itself to all the expenses and public scrutiny of litigation that it 
was hoping to avoid by arbitration. The presumption against 
severability, therefore, provides strong incentive for a business to not 
include unconscionable contractual provisions in its arbitration 
agreements. 
Section 5 provides that including any one of these presumptively 
unconscionable terms in a standard form contract will be a violation 
of unfair and deceptive trade practice statutes under state law.207 
Invoking state unfair and deceptive trade practice laws provides 
claimants an avenue to different remedies than are available through 
arbitration.208  Under deceptive trade practice laws, presumptively 
unconscionable terms in an agreement can result in a court holding 
the contract unenforceable and also provide for a cause of action 
under state law.209 Similar to section 4, considering the inclusion of a 
presumptively unconscionable provision in an agreement a violation 
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of state deceptive trade practice laws will discourage businesses from 
using unconscionable terms as a means to chill putative claims. 
Although Title IV does not expand the doctrine of 
unconscionability to deny the enforceability of a larger range of 
arbitration provisions than the common law currently does, sections 4 
and 5 provide statutory language that may be strong enough to 
dissuade businesses from including terms that are unconscionable. 
Dissuading businesses from including unconscionable terms in 
arbitration agreements may serve to counter the chilling effect that 
arbitration generally has on claims. Under Title IV, potential 
claimants can be sure that the terms of their arbitration will meet 
standards sufficient to pass common law unconscionability challenges 
and will not have to waste any time or money disputing the terms of 
the arbitration agreement. If potential claimants don’t have to expend 
resources disputing the terms of the agreement, their potential reward 
is bigger, and they therefore have more incentive to assert a claim.  
C. Prohibition of Forced Arbitration Clauses Under State Law 
Title V of the Model Act essentially reserves to the states the 
express authority to govern the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements when the agreement is not already subject to the FAA.210 
Since the expansion of the FAA’s scope, Title V is helpful in the 
sense that it outlines the circumstances under which the FAA does not 
apply. Recall that the FAA does not preempt the “entire field of 
arbitration,”211 and the federal government, through various actions, 
has carved out limited exceptions to which the FAA does not 
apply.212 Title V asserts that when state law governs the 
enforceability of a contract, forced arbitration clauses will be void as 
a matter of law.213 
By adopting section 1 of Title V, a state would be unequivocally 
declaring that forced arbitration agreements contravene its public 
policy.214 Section 1, therefore, provides constructive notice that the 
state will prohibit the formation and enforcement of forced arbitration 
 
210 MODEL ACT, supra note 82, at 48–49. 
211 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
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agreements, except when doing so would be inconsistent with federal 
law.215 
Sections 2 through 4 of Title V prohibit arbitration agreements in 
contracts that various federal actions have already put beyond the 
scope of the FAA.216 Section 2 of Title V prohibits arbitration clauses 
in insurance contracts pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which 
allows states to regulate arbitration clauses in insurance contracts.217 
Similarly, section 3 prohibits arbitration clauses in employment 
contracts for workers known to be exempt from the FAA.218 The 
FAA expressly excludes “contracts of employment of seamen, 
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign 
or interstate commerce,”219 and the Supreme Court has removed 
“transportation workers” from the reach of the FAA.220 In a state that 
has not adopted section 3, there would be the open question of 
whether that state’s laws would follow the FAA and permit the 
enforceability of a forced arbitration agreement. In a state that has 
adopted section 3, however, there is no question that a forced 
arbitration agreement will not be enforced. Section 4 is referred to by 
the NCLC as the catchall provision to Title V, and provides that any 
forced arbitration agreement not covered by federal law will be held 
invalid, unenforceable, and void under state law.221 
Noticeably, Title V does not carve out any room for states to 
regulate arbitration; instead, it restates where the FAA has no effect to 
begin with. In the same way that the FAA is widely regarded as 
evidence of the “national policy in favor of arbitration,”222 a state that 
adopts Title V is a declaration of the state’s policy in opposition to 
certain aspects of arbitration, specifically forced arbitration. At 
minimum, Title V clearly informs parties who wish to include an 
arbitration clause in their contract that a state court generally prohibits 
forced arbitration agreements. Moreover, similar to the way that the 
FAA has received its preemptive force through Supreme Court 
decisions, a state, through enacting the unequivocal language of Title 
V, may embolden its courts to find more unconventional ways to 
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strike forced arbitration agreements and bolster the states’ opposition 
to forced arbitration. 
D. Data Disclosure Requirements for Arbitration Providers 
Title VI targets arbitration providers rather than arbitration 
agreements and mandates the disclosure of certain data for each 
proceeding.223 Placing the emphasis on arbitration administrators is a 
clever method of reserving at least one aspect of arbitration for states 
while avoiding preemption by the FAA, a law that specifically targets 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.224 Title VI requires the 
disclosure of certain information in an arbitration proceeding for the 
purpose of exposing any bias or corruption of arbitrators.225 By 
emphasizing disclosure, Title VI closely resembles California’s 
regulations pertaining to arbitration.226 Although the Model Act and 
the California rules share a common purpose, the California rules 
require arbitration administrators to disclose more data of arbitration 
proceedings than the Model Act, and, as a result, the California rules 
are better suited to exposing any bias or corruption in arbitration 
proceedings. 
Title VI is composed of five sections, and section 2 lists the 
information that arbitration administrators are required to disclose.227 
At the outset, subsection (a) indicates that only private companies 
administering five or more arbitration proceedings in a year are 
required to collect and publish the specified information.228 
Subsection (a) outlines various pieces of information that the 
arbitration administrator is required to collect and publish.229 
Moreover, section 2(b) provides that arbitration administrators must 
update their records quarterly, and that the information should be 
available from administrator websites or made available in hard 
copies upon request.230  If an arbitration provider fails to comply with 
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those requirements, injunctive relief is the only relief available to a 
winning party.231 
Again, the California rules have very similar disclosure 
requirements, but require arbitration administrators to collect and 
record more information than is required under the Model Act.232 The 
substantive disclosure requirements in the California rules are 
contained in section 1281.96 of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure. Section 1281.96(a) differs from the Model Act in that it 
applies to private arbitration companies that administer or are 
otherwise involved in arbitration proceedings.233 The California rules 
have a wider scope than the Model Act because they apply to private 
arbitration companies which not only administer the proceeding, but 
also those which otherwise participate in the proceeding.234 
Moreover, the California rules apply to arbitration companies 
regardless of the number of arbitrations they administer, whereas the 
Model Act requires only arbitration administrators who administer 
five or more arbitration proceedings in a year to disclose 
information.235 
The information that must be collected and published is set out in 
section 1281.96(a)(1)-(11) of the California rules.236 A prevalent 
distinction made in the California rules that has no analog in the 
Model Act is that between the consumer and non-consumer party.237 
The California rules are specific to consumer arbitration and 
consequently use consumer law-specific terms, but the distinction 
could be easily adapted to be employee and employer, or even 
drafting and non-drafting party. Distinguishing the consumer from the 
non-consumer, like the California rules require,238 can be a proxy for 
determining the bargaining power that led to the arbitration agreement 
in the first place. The non-consumer party will ordinarily be a 
business which drafted the contract that included the arbitration 
agreement, and thus, is the party who prefers arbitration. If searching 
for biased arbitrators, this is useful information because the non-
 
231 Id. 
232 Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281–1284.3 (West 2015) and MODEL ACT, 
supra note 82, at 51. 
233 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a). 
234 Id. 
235 Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281–1284.3 and MODEL ACT, supra note 82, 
at 51. 
236 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a). 
237 Id. § 1281.96(a)(2), (4)–(6). 
238 Id. § 1281.96(a)(2). 
BRUNINO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2017  6:18 PM 
2017] A Modest Proposal: Review of the National Consumer Law Center’s 601 
Model State Consumer and Employee Justice Enforcement Act 
consumer, or drafting party, is the party who prescribes the rules of 
the arbitration, including who the arbitrator would be.239 If one gives 
any merit to the repeat player bias argument, the non-consumer is the 
repeat player who the arbitration administrator should theoretically 
favor.240 Searching for bias in arbitration proceedings is therefore 
easier if the administrator’s records reflect the consumer/non-
consumer classification of each party, as opposed to merely the names 
of each party as required by the Model Act.241 
Relatedly, section 1281.96(a)(4)–(5) maintain the consumer and 
non-consumer distinction when identifying the parties, but also 
require the arbitration administrator to record both if the non-
consumer party prevailed at the proceeding242 and the total number of 
times the non-consumer party has been a party to an arbitration 
administered by the arbitration company.243 Both subsections 
1281.96(a)(4) and (5) require the recording of information extremely 
useful to exposing any bias by the arbitration provider.244 If a party 
with a pending arbitration wanted to look for any biases of the 
arbitrator towards an adverse party prior to the arbitration, one would 
naturally look to see if an arbitration administrator has arbitrated a 
dispute for the adverse party in the past, and if so, how frequently and 
if the adverse party usually prevailed under that arbitrator. If an 
individual knew that she would be before an arbitrator who routinely 
arbitrates matters in a particular industry or area of law, one would 
more generally look to see if the arbitrator favors non-consumers, 
consumers, or is truly impartial. The Model Act does not have 
analogous provisions to section 1281.96(a)(4)–(5) of the California 
rules. As a result, exposing bias under the Model Act would be much 
more tedious due to the relatively limited data arbitration 
administrators are required to collect and record. The California rules 
require arbitration administrators to record data that facilitate more 
direct inquires that may expose biased arbitration administrators than 
do the model rules. 
There is considerable overlap between the Model Act and the 
California rules, and it would be an overstatement to suggest the 
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differences between both codes render the Model Act ineffective. The 
Model Act requires arbitration providers to record and compile very 
similar data, albeit by metrics not necessarily helpful in exposing 
bias.245 For example, section 2(a)(vi) requires arbitration 
administrators to record the date they received the demand for 
arbitration, the date the arbitrator was appointed, and the date of the 
arbitration’s disposition.246 The dates required to be reported by 
section 2(a)(iv) are important because they provide a reference point 
for an investigator going through volumes of data; however, this 
section won’t expose any biased arbitrators unless the dates are 
compared with other information. 
Similarly, the fact that the California rules apply to arbitration 
administrators who administer less than five arbitrations in a year, and 
to arbitration administrators who are involved in, and not just 
administering arbitrations make the California rules only marginally 
better than the Model Act. Although Title VI is narrower in scope 
than the California rules, it is sufficiently broad to apply to a majority 
of arbitrators. There is very little opportunity for a conflict of interest 
or bias by an arbitrator who administers less than five proceedings a 
year, given that the arbitrator would often have simply seen too few 
parties for bias to be present. However, even an arbitrator who 
oversees fewer than five proceedings in a year would give the 
perception of partiality if all the proceedings involved the same party. 
If an arbitrator administered four proceedings in a year, and the same 
party was not only involved in each proceeding, but always prevailed, 
would one not have a reasonable suspicion of bias by the arbitrator? 
Were this the case, under Title VI, the arbitration administrator would 
not be obligated to collect and record any information from the 
arbitrations.247 However, under the California standards, information 
of these arbitrations would not only be recorded, it would be clear 
from the arbitration administrator’s records which party was the 
business and whether or not that business prevailed.248 
The Model Act exposes a conflict of interest only if someone were 
to comb the records specifically looking for grounds for potential bias 
and don’t require arbitration administrators to record any information 
that would necessarily draw one’s attention to a biased arbitrator. To 
be sure, Title VI could expose some bias, but only if a party were 
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willing to sort through volumes of records on arbitration proceedings, 
deliberately searching for patterns of particular arbitrators repeatedly 
favoring particular parties or interests. Surely, such a purpose is better 
served under the California rules that require arbitration 
administrators to record how often they arbitrate for non-consumers 
and when the non-consumer prevails. 
E. Appellate Jurisdiction 
The purpose of Title VII is to increase the efficiency of arbitration 
proceedings.249 To do so, Title VII provides that appellate courts 
“shall not have jurisdiction to review a trial court’s interlocutory order 
denying a motion to compel arbitration or otherwise concluding that 
an arbitration agreement is unenforceable or does not cover a 
particular claim.”250 Moreover, “appellate review of the denial of a 
motion to compel arbitration may be had after a final judgment has 
been issued.”251 Finally, “an interlocutory appeal shall be allowed if 
the trial court orders arbitration and dismisses the suit, or orders 
arbitration and stays litigation.”252 
Because Title VII only precludes an interlocutory appeal of a court 
order denying a motion to compel arbitration and allows an 
interlocutory appeal for a court order to compel arbitration, Title VII 
is very one-sided in favor of the plaintiff in a dispute. However, since 
interlocutory appeals increase the cost of pursuing a claim and 
ultimately lower the potential reward for the plaintiff, interlocutory 
appeals can chill low-value claims and thus harm only plaintiffs.253 In 
low-value disputes, the economic viability of the claim deteriorates 
when a plaintiff must expend time and money enforcing an arbitration 
agreement before either a court or an arbitrator gets to the merits of 
the claim. A defendant can extinguish a low-value claim with 
interlocutory appeals that deplete the resources of the plaintiff before 
the merits of the claim are even heard. Therefore, the language of 
Title VII is one sided in favor of plaintiffs for a good reason: to 
prevent arbitration agreements from frustrating plaintiffs’ efforts to 
pursue their claims under state law.254 
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Additionally, Title VII runs so clearly counter to business interests 
that state legislatures may have trouble enacting it. Just as strong 
support from the business community helped enact the FAA despite 
procedural concerns with arbitration at the time,255 the business 
community’s significant lobbying strength may in some states prevent 
Title VII from ever being adopted. Moreover, the business lobby has 
been credited with stopping the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) from 
being enacted, despite a ripe political climate.256 Since Title VII very 
clearly disfavors the business community, it may be practically 
difficult to pass through the legislatures of some states. 
Title VII, in eliminating interlocutory appeals for trial court 
decisions denying motions to compel arbitration, presents a legally 
sound method of countering the practice of using arbitration 
agreements as a method of deterring putative claims. A putative 
plaintiff is more likely to assert a claim under state law if she knows 
she will not have to expend time and money disputing an arbitration 
agreement before the merits of the case are heard. However, again, 
because Title VII so clearly disfavors the business community, it may 
prove difficult to enact into law in some state legislatures. 
F. Improper Delay 
Title VIII, added in a revised edition of the Model Act, is intended 
to “protect[] parties’ rights to enter into private agreements to resolve 
their private disputes expeditiously.”257 By proposing Title VIII, the 
NCLC aimed to combat parties who use the procedures of the 
arbitration administrator that they have chosen to prevent the 
arbitration proceeding from going forward in an expeditious 
manner.258 Simply put, Title VIII is a mechanism through which 
arbitration administrators can enforce their own procedural rules “to 
ensure that they arbitrate disputes efficiently and speedily.”259 
Although Title VIII is well conceived and may serve to expedite some 
arbitration proceedings, the NCLC is the first to point out the title’s 
shortcoming—namely that a business may designate an arbitration 
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administrator that is not subject to Title VIII or specify rules and 
procedures in the arbitration agreement that will prolong the 
resolution of the dispute.260 
Title VIII is organized like the others in the Model Act, beginning 
with a findings section in section 1.261 Section 2 covers arbitration 
administrators and indicates that Title VIII applies to arbitration 
administrators in that state who administered at least three arbitration 
proceedings in the last twelve months.262 Section 3 provides that 
when a respondent subject to an arbitration agreement that requires 
the respondent to pay fees has not paid fees within seven days of his 
or her due date, the arbitration administrator must either schedule a 
hearing notwithstanding the respondent’s failure to pay fees or refuse 
to administer the arbitration.263 Section 4 contains provisions 
identical to section 3, but seeks to prevent pending cases from being 
suspended, as opposed to section 3, which seeks to ensure that 
arbitration proceedings can get underway.264 Section 5 contains 
disclosure requirements for arbitration proceedings covered by this 
title. Arbitrators must disclose 
when each arbitration demand was made, when each demand for 
payment of costs and fees is made, the date the respondent paid all 
fees and costs requested, when a hearing was held, when the award 
was issued, when the arbitration administrator provided a letter 
indicating the arbitration would not proceed, and when the 
arbitration proceeding was terminated for lack of payment in 
resulting award is made . . . .265 
Section 6 is the enforcement provision of Title VIII, providing for 
declaratory or injunctive relief brought by private parties or the state 
attorney general.266 Lastly, section 7 provides that arbitrators who 
administer an arbitration proceeding notwithstanding the non-
payment of fees by the respondent under sections 3(b) or 4(b) may 
pursue a breach of contract action against the respondents for 
outstanding fees.267 
 
260 Id. at 58. 
261 Id. at 55. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 55–56. 
265 Id. at 56. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
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The provisions of Title VIII may well be effective in expediting 
arbitration proceedings to those agreements which it applies, but as 
the NCLC explains, it is powerless to expedite a proceeding to which 
it does not apply.268 In states that do not adopt Title VIII, or in 
arbitration agreements that expressly provide that the agreement will 
not be subject to the provisions of Title VIII, the protections will be 
inapplicable. In a predispute arbitration agreement, the parties could 
contract around the provisions of Title VIII through specifying that 
certain other arbitral rules apply.269 
Furthermore, although Title VIII, section 6 allows for a private 
cause of action to require compliance with the substantive provisions 
(sections 3 and 4), the preceding Title VII is predicated on the notion 
that the financial burden of enforcing arbitration agreements can be 
prohibitive.270 The notes to Title VII specifically provides that having 
to appeal a trial court decision denying a motion to compel arbitration 
is problematic because the appeal is expensive and can chill 
claims.271 It follows that enforcing arbitration agreements is 
inefficient for a plaintiff regardless of whether the plaintiff is in trial 
or appellate court. If one accepts that the burden of having to enforce 
arbitration agreements is prohibitively expensive for some claimants, 
or at least economically frustrated, a private cause of action is a 
seemingly superficial enforcement mechanism. A party who prolongs 
an arbitration proceeding by not paying its share of the arbitration 
expenses will not be deterred from doing so by private causes of 
action against it that the party knows will never come to fruition. 
Thus, assuming the premise of Title VII is true—that having to 
enforce arbitration agreements can chill claims—the only true 
enforcement mechanism is the potential of a suit brought by the 
attorney general.272 
CONCLUSION 
The NCLC assumes a tall task in offering the Model Act as 
potential statutory language to preserve state autonomy in enforcing 
arbitration agreements while avoiding federal preemption by the 
FAA. Rather than look to the Supreme Court or Congress to overhaul 
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the FAA, the Model Act proposes statutory language intended to be 
effective even absent judicial or legislative intervention. The NCLC’s 
approach should thus be commended for its pragmatic restraint in an 
area of law where federal preemption of state statutes is all but 
inevitable. However, the Model Act does not address some major 
harms of current FAA jurisprudence, particularly those resulting from 
class action waivers and arbitration’s tendency to chill low-value 
claims. For having not addressed the more major issues with 
arbitration, the Model Act is a more modest proposal than what is 
needed to meaningfully loosen the grip federal law holds on 
arbitration. Despite the shortcomings of the Model Act, it is hard to 
fault the NCLC for not finding more room for state statutes in an area 
of law increasingly dominated by the FAA. Despite its pragmatism 
and restraint, still, some sections of the Model Act do little to enhance 
the protection of consumers or employees and yet still flirt with 
preemption by the FAA. This suggests that the FAA would almost 
certainly subsume any bolder approach that might attempt to protect 
against arbitration’s more serious harms. The shortcomings of the 
Model Act suggest that if there is ever to be a body of state law on 
arbitration, there will first have to be a re-evaluation of the national 
policy in favor of arbitration. 
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